{"id":87972,"date":"2026-09-06T20:22:22","date_gmt":"2026-09-06T19:22:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ktebiktebek.com\/?post_type=product&p=87972"},"modified":"2026-10-10T21:18:28","modified_gmt":"2026-10-10T20:18:28","slug":"conventional-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/ktebiktebek.com\/ar\/livre\/conventional-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Conventional Deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"

Conventional Deterrence de John J. Mearsheimer est un ouvrage de g\u00e9opolitique consacr\u00e9 aux causes de la guerre conventionnelle. L'auteur y analyse pourquoi la dissuasion \u00e9choue, \u00e0 travers les crises de 1939-1940, le Moyen-Orient et l'\u00e9quilibre OTAN\u2013Pacte de Varsovie, pour un ouvrage d'occasion disponible avec livraison en Tunisie.<\/p>\n

\u00c9tat et d\u00e9tails de cet exemplaire<\/h2>\n

Conventional Deterrence<\/i> is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939?1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.<\/p>\n

Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of “offensive” weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.<\/p>\n

R\u00e9sum\u00e9 de Conventional Deterrence<\/h2>\n

Conventional Deterrence s'interroge sur les origines de la guerre : pourquoi des \u00c9tats confront\u00e9s \u00e0 la perspective d'une grande guerre conventionnelle choisissent-ils, ou non, une strat\u00e9gie offensive ? John J. Mearsheimer examine plusieurs crises ayant conduit \u00e0 des guerres majeures afin d'expliquer les \u00e9checs de la dissuasion. Il \u00e9tudie d'abord les d\u00e9cisions alli\u00e9es et allemandes en 1939-1940, puis les doctrines strat\u00e9giques isra\u00e9liennes et \u00e9gyptiennes avant les grands conflits du Moyen-Orient. L'auteur \u00e9value ensuite les forces de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie pour d\u00e9terminer les perspectives de dissuasion conventionnelle. Il aborde aussi des questions techniques, comme l'impact des munitions guid\u00e9es de pr\u00e9cision et le d\u00e9bat entre guerre de man\u0153uvre et guerre d'usure. Il conteste enfin l'id\u00e9e que la dissuasion d\u00e9pend surtout de l'\u00e9quilibre num\u00e9rique des forces, ainsi que l'explication des \u00e9checs par la domination des armes \u00ab offensives \u00bb.<\/p>\n

\u00c0 propos de John J. Mearsheimer<\/h2>\n

John J. Mearsheimer est un politologue am\u00e9ricain, professeur \u00e0 l'universit\u00e9 de Chicago et figure de l'\u00e9cole r\u00e9aliste des relations internationales. Il est notamment l'auteur de The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) et de Why Leaders Lie (2011). Ses travaux portent sur la guerre, la dissuasion et la puissance des \u00c9tats.<\/p>\n

Tous les livres de John J. Mearsheimer<\/a><\/p>\n

Fiche du livre<\/h2>\n